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    Yogaacaara Buddhism and Husserl
     
    [ 作者: M. J. Larrabee   来自:期刊原文   已阅:3447   时间:2007-1-10   录入:douyuebo


    ·期刊原文
    The one and the many: Yogaacaara Buddhism and Husserl

    By M. J. Larrabee
    Philosophy East and West
    Volume 32 No. 1
    January, 1981
    p. 3-14
    (C) by University of Hawaii Press


    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

     

     

                                    p. 3

            INTRODUCTION

            Among  the  teachings   of  the  Buddhist   school  of
            aacaara,(1) the doctrine  of the  aalayavij~naana  (or
            aalaya,   for   short)  is   especially   unique   and
            perplexing.  The Yogaacaara  or Vij~naanavaada  school
            evolved  between  350 and 500 A.D., stimulating  other
            followers  in India and China into the ninth  century.
            The  school  posits  a form  of  subjective  idealism,
            partially   in  reaction  to  the  movement  begun  by
            Naagaarjuna  in the second century  A.D., a philosophy
            which  had denied  the reality  of both  the empirical
            world and the self.  Yogaacaara  attempts to establish
            the reality  of the self as consciousness  in order to
            overcome  the skepticism  and nihilism  engendered  by
            Naagaarjuna's teachings.(2)

                The doctrine of the aalayavij~naana  ("storehouse
            consciousness") is central to Yogaacaara metaphysics,
            but  it  appears  impervious  to  a  clearly  defined
            conceptual interpretation.  At times the aalaya seems
            to be only one of many elements  of consciousness, all
            possessing more or less equal stature. At other times,
            however, the aalaya seems to take on a predominant and
            fundamental  role, separating itself from the elements
            of any particular consciousness  and laying claim to a
            metaphysical  status  which amounts  to the source  of
            particularity  within  the  spatio-temporal  world  as
            ordinarily experienced. Commentators, mirroring one or
            another  aspect of this fluctuation, have likened  the
            aalaya   to   both   Freud's   unconscious,   (3)   an
            ego-centered  and particularized  phenomenon  although
            with a general shared structure, and Jung's collective
            unconscious,  (4)  a   basic,  universally   specified
            phenomenon which underlies any particularized ego.

                In this article, I wish  to sketch  an additional
            comparison--in    this    instance,    between    the
            aalayanij~naana  of Buddhist  idealism and the "flux"
            of  Husserlian  idealism,  a  structure  also  termed
            inner-time  consciousness.  In particular I will show
            the extent to which one phase of Husserl's  notion of
            consciousness  can illuminate some of the theoretical
            problems  which  emerge  from  the  doctrine  of  the
            aalaya. As we shall see, the similarities between the
            flux and the aalaya  may stem, in part, from attempts
            on  the  part  of both  philosophies  to  ground  the
            particularity of the ego-experienced  spatio-temporal
            realm in a primordial consciousness of some sort.

                The article  will  take  the following  course: I
            will  first  outline  the  important  points  of  the
            Yogaacaara  system, with emphasis on the doctrine  of
            the aalaya  and its mode  of operation.  Next, I will
            discuss the Husserlian notion of the flux and compare
            it with the aalaya  in a preliminary  way.  The final
            section   will   be  an  effort   at  extending   the
            metaphysical  implications  of the  comparison to its
            furthest  point;  hopefully, some  additional insight
            into  the  problems  inherent  in the doctrine of the
            aalaya will result.


                                    p. 4

            I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE AALAYAVIJ~NAANA

            The Yogaacaara  school  of Buddhism, with  the aid of
            Western  philosophical  terminology, can be described
            as a metaphysical  idealism.  Its main advocates were
            Asa^nga  and  Vasubandhu,  who, in  the  late  fourth
            century, drew inspiration  from earlier (and, for us,
            anonymous)     suutras,     in     particular     the
            Sa^mdhinirmocana   Suutra   and   the  La^nkaavataara
            Suutra. The Yogaacaarins held that only consciousness
            is real. Consequently, neither the external objective
            world  nor the "internal"  egological  world  exists.
            Both   types   of   reality   are   the   result   of
            transformations   of   consciousness.   The   various
            arguments which the Yogaacaarins  set forth to defend
            their idealism will not be discussed  here, since our
            interest   concerns  only  the  description   of  how
            consciousness operates.

                This  description  begins  with  the positing  of
            eight types of consciousness.(5) This multiplicity on
            the part of consciousness  is intended to explain the
            different functions by which consciousness apparently
            "creates"    the    illusions    of    an    existing
            spatio-temporal  world  and the internal  ego-worlds.
            These  eight  types  of consciousness  are: the  five
            external  senses  (vision, hearing, and so on), which
            count as the first through the fifth consciousnesses;
            an internal sense-center  (sixth);  the "mind" or the
            discriminating  consciousness, termed   manovij~naana
            (seventh);  and  the  aalaya  (eighth),  also  called
            storehouse   or  home  consciousness,  receptacle  or
            appropriating  consciousness, or seed  consciousness.
            This eighth  consciousness  is, however, first in the
            order of importance  with respect  to generating  the
            movement   from   the  oneness   of  true  being   as
            consciousness  to the multiplicity of apparent beings
            within  the  spatio-temporal   world,  including,  of
            course, the  many  empirical  consciousnesses  (human
            persons).  It is termed  the first transformation  of
            consciousness   as  derivable   from  what  might  be
            described   as   the   "pure"   or  real   state   of
            consciousness;  consequently, it  is  the  ground  or
            condition    for   the   operation   of   the   other
            transformations  of consciousness which take place in
            the functioning  of mind (the second  transformation)
            and the six senses (the third transformation).

                What, then, is  the  aalayavij~naana, the  eighth
            type    of    consciousness?    Asa^nga     in    his
            Mahaayaanasa^mgraha summarizes its nature as follows:
            "All actions  (dharmas) which are blemished...  lodge
            in it in the quality of fruit and... it itself lodges
            in   these   dharmas   in  the   quality   of   cause
            (hetubhavana)...."(6) The aalaya, then, has a twofold
            character--it  "receives"  and "stores"  the fruit of
            actions  and perceptions, the dharmas, in the form of
            seeds, and it causes further actions  and perceptions
            on the  basis  of these  seeds.  In short, it is both
            caused by and causes dharmas.(7)

                We  may  note  at  this  point   that  this  dual
            character  of the aalaya  answers  one problem  which
            besets    any    idealism:   if   neither    enduring
            spatio-temporal  objects  nor  enduring  subject-egos
            exist,  how  can  the  regularity,  consistency,  and
            continuity   of  our  experience  be  explained?  The
            Yogaacaarins  claim  that  these  characteristics  of
            experience flow from the causal force of the seeds on
            the


                                    p. 5

            aalaya, seeds  which  regularly  "perfume"  the other
            consciousnesses (as the original texts express it) in
            a specific  way which gives  rise again and again  to
            the same manifestations  (for example, the apparently
            subsisting  trees,  birds,  and  so  on).8Thus my
            experience  of myself as an enduring  subject  arises
            regularly  because  the aalaya   receives  the  fruit
            (effects) of a mind (manovij~naana) which  illusorily
            posits my self as an enduring  entity.  This illusory
            belief  in turn is caused  by the seeds of the aalaya
            operating on the mind.  The interplay of reciprocally
            affecting aalaya and manas perpetuates  the belief in
            an enduring self.  and the perpetuation of the belief
            leads to the assumption  of the "real" existence of a
            self which is the object of that belief.  In the same
            way, the experience  of enduring  physical objects in
            an  enduring   spatio-temporal   world  derives   its
            continuity and consistency  from the mutual causation
            between  the  aalaya  and the other  seven  types  of
            consciousness.(9)

                Thus far, the doctrine  of the aalaya appears  to
            cohere well with the basic idealistic position of the
            Yogaacaara  school.   However,  certain  difficulties
            arise upon closer  investigation.  First, what is the
            proper character of the aalaya? To be consistent with
            their  adherence  to  the  no-soul  doctrine  of  the
            Buddha,  the  Yogaacaarins   cannot  view  it  as  an
            enduring   soullike   "container"   which  holds  the
            constantly passing seeds.  On the other hand, they do
            not want to claim  that the aalaya  is equivalent  in
            structure with these seeds. The latter interpretation
            would  result  in  a  continuous  defilement  by  the
            non-aalaya  consciousnesses  causing  the seeds, thus
            rendering impossible the attainment of nirvaana, that
            pure state of consciousness  defined by the cessation
            of such defilements.(10)

                Asa^nga does not resolve this problem.  He states
            only:  "These   seeds   are   substantially   neither
            different  from  nor identical  with  the  receptacle
            consciousness   (aalayavij~naana)  ."(11)  But   this
            statement merely reiterates the preceding position in
            an ambiguous and paradoxical manner: the seeds cannot
            be different  from the aalaya because then the aalaya
            would  be  an  enduring  substratum  underlying   the
            momentary  seeds, all of which are distinct  from it.
            On the other hand, the seeds cannot be equivalent  to
            the aalaya  because  then no consciousness  free from
            the defilements of these seeds would be possible. But
            if the  aalaya  can  be characterized  in neither  of
            these ways, how then can it be characterized?

                A second  and  related  difficulty  concerns  the
            predication  of number to the aalaya --  is it one or
            many? The texts themselves do not resolve this issue,
            although certain indications are available. There are
            two predominant interpretations on this point. First,
            the aalaya is one, but "materializes"  at many points
            as individual  consciousnesses  which are empirically
            but  erroneously  viewed  as individual  ego-centered
            persons.  Second, the aalaya  is many, that  is, each
            individual  person  has an aalaya as one of the eight
            consciousnesses which make up that individual.  As we
            can  see, the latter  interpretation  emphasizes  the
            psychological  descriptive  aspect  of the Yogaacaara
            doctrine,   while   the   former    highlights    the
            metaphysical or ontological aspect.(12)

                The psychological  view was taken by Hsuan-Tsang,
            a seventh-century

     

                                    p. 6

            Chinese  follower  and interpreter  of the Yogaacaara
            school.  He notes  in his commentary  on Vasubandhu's
            Thirty  Verses, the Ch'eng  wei-shih  lun: "The  word
            `consciousness' generally expresses the idea that all
            human  beings  each possess  eight  consciousnesses,"
            including    the   aalaya   consciousness.(13)   This
            interpretation   militates   against   any   monistic
            tendencies  of the  doctrine  of  consciousness-only,
            which at times seems  to posit  some single  ultimate
            reality.  For  Hs乤n-Tsang, such  a  single  ultimate
            could not even be "True Thusness" (tathaagatataa), as
            many Buddhists describe the state of absolute reality
            reached in nirvaa.na, since Hs乤n-Tsang  claimed that
            even  tathaagatataa  is "possessed"  in an individual
            way by each human being.  Only by inferring that True
            Thusness is one and the same in each individual (thus
            dissolving  any  and  all  individuality)  could  one
            arrive at a monism on Hs乤n-Tsang's interpretation of
            the aalaya.  It might  be noted, however, that if one
            takes  into  account   the  Buddhist   penchant   for
            confounding  the  law  of  contradiction, a  monistic
            position might be feasible  by claiming that Thusness
            is neither one (because  each human being can possess
            it)  nor  many  (because   it  is  the  one  ultimate
            reality).  Hs乤n-Tsang  might then be interpreted  as
            discussing merely one common aspect of the reality of
            the aalaya  and Thusness  when he attributes  both of
            them to individual persons.

                The alternative  interpretation  of the number of
            aalaya  bypasses  a  possible   collision   with  the
            Yogaacaara  monism  by asserting  that the aalaya  is
            one, but that it differentiates  itself  into various
            ego-centers, which  rise and fall like  the waves  of
            the ocean, Also, like  the  waves  of the  ocean, the
            individual  ego-centers  are neither  wholly distinct
            from nor wholly  identical  with the aalaya.  In this
            metaphysically  accented  view, the aalaya acquires a
            more  fundamental  role than  it has in the preceding
            psychological   interpretation.   Here   the   aalaya
            functions   as  the   ground   for   the   individual
            ego-centers and, consequently, as a common ground for
            the consistency of world-experience  undergone by the
            majority  of individual  human subjects, specifically
            the continuous  yet (for  Buddhists) illusory  belief
            engendered   by  the   manas-consciousness   that   a
            substantial   world   with   substantially   enduring
            ego-subjects exists.(14)

                This  interpretation  of the  aalaya  would, to a
            certain  extent, accord with the Yogaacaara  doctrine
            of  the  triple  nature  of reality: reality  is  one
            (monism), but appears  as either perfected, dependent
            or    imagined    (parini.spanna,   paratantra,    or
            parikalpita).(l5) As  perfected, reality  is ultimate
            reality or "Thusness" (tathataa).  Thus the aalaya in
            its perfected  state  is pure  consciousness, totally
            undifferentiated  and undefiled.(16) It is this state
            which a supposedly  existent individual  person would
            reach  upon  attaining  nirvaa.na;  nirvaa.na  is the
            "return" to the one, the cessation of the wave on the
            surface  of the aalaya.  The aalaya  in its dependent
            nature, however, is a continuously  defiled  (by mind
            and sensations) and appearance-causing consciousness,
            which "causes"  the totally unreal imagined nature of
            consciousness  as an empirical  subject living within
            an object-laden  world.  Mind  and  sensasions, alone
            with subjects and world,


                                    p. 7

            are  reality  in its  imagined  state----in  fact, of
            course, unreality mistakenly seen as reality.

                One problem  which the unitary view of the aalaya
            must  face  is how an ultimately  unitary  aalaya  is
            differentiated  into  a plurality  of  different  but
            "con-current consciousnesses or ego-subjects.(17) If
            consciousness  is an ever-flowing  single  stream, as
            the  Yogaacaarins  would  maintain, can  it serve  to
            ground  the diversity  of the  dharmic  series  which
            constitute  the individual  egos' consciousnesses? As
            one  aalaya,  it  should  apparently   give  rise  to
            simultaneous  ego-subjects  which  are  the same  and
            which  lack all distinctions.  This is obviously  not
            the  case, for the many  ego-subjects  are  seemingly
            unique  in the (illusory) characters  they  have, the
            (illusory) actions they perform, and so on. I myself,
            as  a series  of momentary  dharmas, am distinct  and
            different from you.  Consequently, the unitariness of
            the aalaya  must  be interpreted  in a way which  can
            account for the divergencies in its "waves."

                Let us look more closely at the momentariness  of
            the aalaya. As pure flowing consciousness, the aalaya
            is surely beyond description.  The moment we say that
            it flows, we are leaning  toward an entitative  image
            in which we see some thing which constantly  changes.
            Yet  this  is  precisely   not  the  nature  of  pure
            consciousness.  In apprehending pure consciousness as
            one,  we  might  imagine  again  something  which  is
            immutable and possibly lacking in all determinations.
            But, of course, the  aalaya  is not an entity  in any
            sense  of  substantiality, either  as  an  underlying
            substrate  of  changes  or as an immutable  substance
            with a quasi-divine  nature.  Yet constant change and
            immutable    indetermination    both   seem   to   be
            characteristics  of the  aalaya  (although  they  are
            seemingly incompatible  without a grounding substance
            theory).  Can  nonentitative  consciousness  be  both
            constantly   changing   in  its  determinations   and
            immutably  indetermined? For that is precisely how we
            want to interpret the aalaya in its pure reality.  We
            would  like to say that the aalaya  is both momentary
            and  unitary, since  as unitary  it  can  nonetheless
            ground the multiplicity of ego-subjects  in the sense
            that.  in its dependent  nature, it contains  all the
            possible  seeds which can give rise to such "defiled"
            consciousnesses.

                There is another related difficulty which follows
            from  the  above  argument,  that  is, the  seemingly
            temporal  character  of the aalaya  especially  as it
            relates to the problem  of the relation  between  the
            aalaya  and its seeds.  This character  appears  most
            strongly when the Yogaacaarins  employ the image of a
            stream or an ocean with waves to describe  the nature
            of the aalaya.  For example, Vasubandhu  notes in his
            Thirty  Verses  (the  Tri^m`sikaa):  the  aalaya  "is
            always  flowing  like a torrent.....  "(18) The image
            ably emphasizes both the persisting existence and the
            nonsubstantial  charateristics of the aalaya.  Like a
            stream  or  torrent  it  continuously  flows  on, or,
            perhaps   more  accurately,  there  is  a  continuous
            flowing  (not: some thing  is continuously  flowing).
            Also, like the stream, it undergoes continuous change
            or transformation  (recall Heraclitus'  river).  From
            one perspective, such  transformation  can be seen as
            the result of the constant change-

     

                                    p. 8

            over  of  the  momentary   seeds  "carried"   by  the
            aalaya-stream.  But,  as  noted  earlier, a  clearcut
            equivalence does not exist between the aalaya and its
            seeds--  the aalaya is not momentary  simply  because
            each of the seeds is, yet in each of "its" moments it
            is  causing  and  being  caused  anew.  From  another
            perspective,  the  change  of  the  aalaya  could  be
            accounted  for by its nature as a flow: a flowing  is
            never the same, quite apart from whatever  it carries
            along with it.  But, as mentioned earlier, the aalaya
            cannot be completely separated from its seeds; so too
            neither can its changeability be completely separable
            from the momentariness of its seeds.

                Leaving aside the recurrent  dialectical  imagery
            of this description  of the aalaya, let us look  more
            closely   at  the  difficulty   which  I  termed  the
            "seemingly  temporal"  character  of  the  aalaya.  A
            superficial  understanding  of the "flowing" image of
            the  aalaya  might  lead  one  who  is familiar  with
            Western metaphysics to interpret this image as giving
            the aalaya a similarity  to, if not an identity with,
            time.  For  the  Westerner, change  implies  duration
            which in turn implies a length of time which measures
            this  duration.  But for the Yogaacaarin, time  is as
            unreal  as  the  object  which  apparently   subsists
            through change within this time. Any empirical notion
            of time, of clock-time, the time of the universe  and
            the movement of its bodies (charted in years, months,
            days, and  so forth), is rejected  as a construct  of
            mind  (manas).  Consequently, the  aalaya  cannot  be
            termed  temporal  in the usual  sense;  nor can it be
            termed eternal, if eternity  means endless  endurance
            through time. If the aalaya is in any sense temporal,
            the nature of this characteristic  must be elucidated
            by means  of a more primordial  sense  of time and/or
            temporality.

                Now I suggest  that the apparent  tension, if not
            contradiction,  between  a  plurality   of  momentary
            determinations  and an immutably indeterminate  unity
            can   be  better   understood   if  we  introduce   a
            perspective   on  time  foreign   to  the  letter  of
            Yogaacaara  thought  as such.  This  perspective, the
            time   of  absolute   consciousness,  is   found   in
            Husserlian  phenomenology  We  will  now  sketch  the
            relevant features of this notion of time.

            II. HUSSERL'S DOCTRINE OF TIME AS FLUX

            The    core    of   Husserl's    theory    of   inner
            time-consciousness  is found  in his  1905  lectures,
            Towards     the     Phenomenology     of     lnternal
            Time-Consciousness.(19)  In  these  lectures  Husserl
            approaches  the discussion  of time from the point of
            view   of   experience.   Time   is  not   merely   a
            scientifically  objective topic, something apart from
            the experiencing  subject.  Experienced  time  is the
            time   of  living   experience   (Erlebniss-sensings,
            thinkings, willings) of  our  subjective  inwardness,
            rather  than  the  time  of  objects, of  a  physical
            universe    subject   to   putative   natural   laws.
            Experienced  time, however, cannot  be  equated  with
            what might be termed  a factual  psychological  time,
            for example, a person's subjective "measurement" of a
            duration of time, the "feeling"  that "this hour went
            faster  than the last hour."  Husserl's  more radical
            position on time presents a point of view


                                    p. 9

            which  can be applied  to the Yogaacaara  philosophy,
            despite its rejection of time as an objective measure
            of passing moments.

                For  Husserl, inner  time  is most  fundamentally
            consciousness  self-constituting   itself.   At  this
            level, inner  time  is  aware  of itseIf  in its  own
            conscious  flow  and, consequently, generates  itself
            and all experiences  as temporal.  Husserl names this
            consciousness    the   "flux"   to   emphasize    its
            primordiality.  This consciousness  of inner  time is
            both multiphased and synthesized as a unity--many yet
            one.   The   former   characteristic   refers   to  a
            composition  of many phases of the flow, for example,
            consciousness of the present moment, of a past moment
            as just past (called "retention"), of a future moment
            (called  "protention").(20) However, these  different
            phases  do not comprise  a series  of really discrete
            moments,   for   all   phases    are    fundamentally
            interconnected.   Inner   time-consciousness   has  a
            synthetic unity which derives from the fact that each
            phase occurs "all-at-once"  within  the consciousness
            of the Now.  This occurrence all-at-once  is within a
            living present which Husserl  distinguishes  from the
            present of the Now-point.

                The painfully  brief discussion  of the preceding
            paragraph illustrates  the difficulty in describing a
            phenomenon  which  in some  sense  both is and is not
            temporal.  As Husserl notes, "names are lacking"  for
            the  absolute   characteristics   of  the   flux   of
            inner-time  consciousness,(21) even  though  we often
            speak  of it in terms  which  are  normally  used  to
            describe the constituted  stream of experience rather
            than  the  constituting  flux.  As we have  seen, the
            Yogaacaarin avoids this problem of description by the
            use of metaphorical descriptions  which lack specific
            temporal  terminology, but which  imply  some type of
            nonserial  temporality  (for  example, the aalaya  is
            like  an ocean  with its waves  or a stream  with its
            rippling current).(22) Husserl naturally  avoids such
            images, but he nonetheless  attempts to describe  the
            flux: it is, for  example, not  an object, a process,
            or any kind of thing which  alters  or persists.  The
            flux  is not in time, is not itself  temporal  in the
            usual sense.(23) Since the flux is not in time, it is
            said to be "all-at-once," a phrase  which  itself  is
            subject  to the misinterpretation  inherent  in using
            "time"  talk.  Also, Husserl  equates  the flux  with
            absolute    consciousness.(24)   Because    of   this
            equivalence  of the flux with absolute consciousness,
            the  flux   cannot   be  considered   a  metaphysical
            principle independent of consciousness  --the flux is
            consciousness taken in its absolute sense. Therefore,
            in some difficult to understand  yet important sense,
            it   parallels   the   Yogaacaarin   view   of   pure
            consciousness as the absolute or perfected reality.

                The  concept  of "all-at-once"  is  based  on the
            notion  of  the  "living  present," a highly  complex
            concept  in Husserl's  later philosophy  of time.(25)
            For our purposes, the living present may be described
            as the active  focus  of the self-differentiation  of
            absolute  consciousness  (also termed  transcendental
            subjectivity), encompassing  both an undifferentiated
            beginning  and the differentiations  of the streaming
            flow of inner time (present  consciousness, retention
            and protention).  Flux  as all-at-once  is the living
            present,  a  unified   synthesis   of  differentiated
            "moments."


                                    p. 10


                This  concept  of the  flux  is crucial  for  our
            interpretation   of  the   aalaya   as  unitary   yet
            momentary, undifferentiated yet distinguished. I will
            return  to this  interpretation  in the next section,
            but  now  I would  like  to  draw  several  parallels
            between  the constituting  character  of the flux and
            the  "causal"  character  of  the  aalaya.  First, in
            Husserl's   phenomenological    discussion   of   the
            constitution  of the  ego, we may  differentiate  two
            meanings   of  "ego"   and  "constitution":  (1)  the
            constitution of an empirical ego (psychological  ego)
            as  a  temporal  and  historical  being, and  (2) the
            constitution  of the  transcendental  ego as absolute
            consciousness.  The first  type  is dependent  on the
            second   type,  just  as  for  the  Yogaacaarin   the
            appearance  of  a mundane  ego  is dependent  on  the
            aalaya  consciousness.  Furthermore, the constitution
            of the transcendental ego is the self-constitution of
            the flux.(26) And although  the Yogaacaarins  have no
            parallel  to the concept  of self-constitution, their
            Absolute would at least be independent  in its being,
            a  concept   analogous   to   Husserl's   notion   of
            self-constitution.

                Second, for  Husserl  the flux  is not  simply  a
            nonpersonal stream of experience;  it is personal, it
            is   always   someone's    ego.(27)   This   ego   or
            transcendental  subjectivity (not to be confused with
            the empirical  ego) serves as repository  of its past
            in the sense  that  the  ego  both  "has"  its living
            experiences   and   retains   them   in   retentional
            modifications    within   its   "unconscious"    (the
            repository  of experiences  and their contents  which
            are no longer held in retentional modifications). The
            ego  also  "has"  the  future   as  its  protentional
            horizon, as the horizon of its possibilities. The ego
            in this sense is termed "monad, " exhibiting  its own
            concreteness  by constituting  itself as a being with
            temporally constituted  experiences  which stretch in
            two  directions  from  the  present.(28) And it lives
            these experiences  all at once as the living present.
            At first sight, the transcendental ego seen from this
            perspective  may appear as a substantial entity quite
            unlike the Yogaacaara  aalaya.  But, for Husserl, the
            transcendental  ego  is not a substance  in the usual
            sense--its  "concreteness"   is  defined  within  the
            flash-point  of the living  present, and consequently
            it does not require  any characteristics  proper to a
            substantial  entity.   Again,  the  Yogaacaarins  use
            metaphor to eke out a description  detailing  how the
            nonsubstantial  aalaya  is  affected  by and  affects
            nonrealities: it  stores  seeds, it  is  perfumed  by
            seeds, and  so on.  Yet  for  both  Husserl  and  the
            Yogaacaarins there remains the difficulty of relating
            a  basically  nonsubstantial   being  with  seemingly
            "substantial" characteristics.

                Third, and finally, in relation  to the  absolute
            consciousness  as monad, Husserl's description of the
            workings  of inner  time-consciousness  includes  the
            element  of  genesis.  In  the  post-Ideas  writings,
            Husserl  frequently  states  that sense  (Sinn) has a
            "genesis" or "history."(29) Sense is the correlate of
            constituting     consciousness;     it     is     the
            object-as-experienced.   To  say  that  sense  has  a
            sense-genesis  is to indicate  a "pointing  back"  or
            reference to something more original and consequently
            something  "prior"  to the sense under investigation.
            This prior element  is the act(s) or noesis(es) which
            originally  constituted   that  sense.(30)  In  other
            words, no  object  of consciousness  occurs  isolated
            from


                                    p. 11

            previous   experience.   At  another   point  Husserl
            describes   the  genesis   of  a  judgment   as  "its
            intentional motivational foundations."(31) The notion
            of genesis as foundation indicates that the presently
            investigated  sense points back to something original
            which serves as a foundation  for the current  sense.
            This foundation  must be present in the structure  of
            the ego for the current  sense  to be constituted  at
            all;  consequently, it is a necessary  condition  for
            the current sense and its constituting  act(s).  This
            characteristic  of the genetic structure of the monad
            recalls the necessary presence of particular seeds in
            the  aalaya  in  order  that  a  particular  mode  of
            consciousness  and/or  object  may appear.  The seeds
            "perfume"  the  aalaya,  and  as  a  result  of  this
            perfuming  the aalya causes  certain  phenomena.  The
            aalaya, then, in its causal  character, is comparable
            to genesis as foundational for sense-constitution.

                But  genesis  as  foundation   is  not  merely  a
            condition   for  the  current   sense;   it  is  also
            "motivational"   (as   mentioned   in   the   earlier
            quotation) in the sense that it provides an impulsion
            or  inducement  toward  the  production  of the  new,
            founded sense.  The term "motivation" gives genesis a
            further significance, since the term implies that the
            foundation is not only a necessary precondition  for,
            but also an affective element in, the constitution of
            the current sense.

                This  motivational   aspect  thus  parallels  the
            Yogaacaara  emphasis on the mutual causation  between
            the aalaya  and its seeds.  The seeds of past actions
            "fall"  into the aalaya, perfume  it and consequently
            "motivate"   the  aalaya  to  cause  further  actions
            conditioned  by the past actions.  Both the theory of
            the  aalaya  and  of  genesis  can  account  for  the
            consistency   within   the  empirical   ego  and  its
            experiences of the spatio-temporal world. While inner
            time-consciousness  gives the formal  conditions  for
            the temporal existence of the ego, both empirical and
            transcendental, the notion  of genesis  explains  the
            determinations  of the material and concrete  aspects
            of  living  experience.  Similarly,  the  concept  of
            aalaya as pure flow provides  the formal grounds  for
            the (apparent) existence of an empirical  ego and the
            spatio-temporal world and also explains the origin of
            the  concrete,  consistent  experiences  within  this
            world.

            III. FINAL COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

            At this point we can state  the explanatory  value of
            Husserl's    doctrine    of   inner   time   for   an
            interpretation  of  the  Yogaacaara  aalayavij~naana.
            Since for Husserl transcendental consciousness is not
            "in" empirical  time, it is not itself empirical, nor
            are  its concretions  within  the  genetic  structure
            empirical.  These  structures  explain  not only  the
            source of empirical time but also the development  of
            a concrete  empirical  ego.  In  this  way  Husserl's
            doctrine  parallels  that of the aalaya, which is the
            cause of the consciousness  of a "real"  world and of
            differentiated  empirical  ego-subjects  experiencing
            themselves as existent in that spatio-temporal realm.

                Thus  far, however, we have  mentioned  only  the
            surface  parallels  between  flux  and  aalaya.   The
            Yogaacaara  doctrine does not specifically  introduce
            the


                                    p. 12

            notion  of a quasi-temporal  characteristic  for  the
            aalaya  similar  to  the  inner-time   of  Husserlian
            transcendental   consciousness.(32)  It  is  at  this
            point, then, that  the  Husserlian  analysis  may  be
            helpful  in understanding  and  expanding  the aalaya
            doctrine,  specifically  for  the  clarification  and
            resolution  of  the  problem  raised  at the  end  of
            section I.  Clearly  the aalaya is not "in" empirical
            time--reality  cannot have the nonreal characteristic
            of empirical temporality.  But, as noted earlier, the
            descriptions   of  the  aalaya  possess   a  timelike
            character.  Could  this  character  be understood  as
            something similar to the inner-time consciousness  in
            Husserl? By such  a comparison, we may discover  that
            at least some, although not all, of the ambiguousness
            of the aalaya's character will be dispersed.

                Husserl's explanation of inner-time consciousness
            would be most relevant  to the problem of whether the
            aalaya is one or many. If we consider the flux as the
            core   of   the   self-constitution    of   Husserl's
            transcendental   consciousness,  we  find   a  single
            undifferentiated    beginning   which   grounds   all
            differentiations   of  sense  constituted  by  it  as
            transcendental consciousness.  How does Husserl allow
            for this movement  from  an undifferentiated  oneness
            (the flow) to differentiated multiplicity? The answer
            to this question clarifies the nature of the flux, to
            the extent that clarification is possible for a being
            with  "no names."  The flux, although  resembling  an
            undifferentiated   oneness,  has  a  double  reality.
            Husserl attempts to capture the nature of the flux by
            terming it the "living present."  This living present
            is  characterized  as both  standing  and  streaming;
            Husserl notes in an unpublished manuscript from 1932:


                The  primordial  level  of  consciousness   is  a
            stream, which stands and streams, which streams  in a
            constantly  invariable  form, so that, however...  in
            the streaming  a doubled present constitutes  itself:
            the present of the respective  worldly perceiving and
            the present  of this perceiving  simultaneously  with
            the  retentions  and protentions  of the  perceptions
            just-past and just-coming.(33)

                Transcendental   consciousness   is  basically  a
            double constitutive  reality.  Within its oneness  as
            living  present,  it  differentiates  itself  in  the
            twofold character  of standing and streaming.  Such a
            differentiation grounds all further differentiations,
            both  on  the  level  of the  primal  temporality  of
            conscious  experiences  and  on  the  empirical,  and
            founded   level  of  "objective"   temporality   (the
            empirical ego and its experiences). Thus, its oneness
            is at once  one and many.  If such a characterization
            is allowed, an ontological  source of the constituted
            world  of  experience  emerges  which  overcomes  the
            difficulties  posed by the problem of the one and the
            many  with respect  to the aalaya.  In applying  this
            characterization of the temporality of transcendental
            consciousness  to the  aalaya, we could  continue  to
            maintain   the  Buddhistic   emphasis   on  a  single
            rationally inexplicable source of Being, while giving
            some concrete  analysis  of the nature of this source
            as a source of multiplicity.

                The aalaya can thus be seen as the living present
            which  is not  an empirical  flow, but exists  as the
            source  of  all  present  empirical  egos  and  their
            supposedly   contemporaneously    present   empirical
            worlds. The streaming characteristic of


                                    p. 13

            the living present adequately  reflects the nature of
            the aalaya  as flowing.  The standing  characteristic
            emphasizes the atemporality  (or, as Husserl puts it,
            the quasi-transtemporality) and unity  of the aalaya.
            It  also  allows  for  the  unitary   nature  of  all
            differentiations which flow causally from the aalaya,
            for example, the fact that all empirical ego-subjects
            seem  to experience  basically  the same  ("nonreal")
            empirical world.  By using the dialectical  character
            of the living  present, we could  thus explicate  the
            aalaya  as  one  reality   which  by  its  nature  is
            fundamentally  differentiated  into a multiplicity of
            temporal modes. From this primal differentiation, the
            higher  level differentiations  into the multiplicity
            of empirical  ego-subjects  would follow, all sharing
            the same ontological  source, yet not all sharing the
            same  empirical  experiences  or dharmic  characters.
            Each "wave"  of the aalaya  would  echo  only certain
            aspects   of  the  total   range   of  higher   level
            differentiations  (in  Husserl,  genetic  contents) .
            Thus, the aalaya in its dependent  or apparent nature
            is many; in its true reality, one.

                To  recapitulate:  the  living  present  is  both
            standing  and  streaming.  As  standing,  it  is  the
            One--the  Now--through  which flow all differentiated
            living experiences  and their contents (my experience
            of  the  spatio-temporal   world  and  of  myself  as
            existing  empirical  subject,  and  so  forth) .   As
            streaming,  it  is  the   Many,  self-differentiating
            itself into a multiphased stream of temporality which
            occurs  all-at-once, thus serving  as source  for the
            multiple experiences within empirical time and space.
            Although Husserl does not equate the constitution  by
            transcendental    consciousness   with   a   complete
            constitution  of all  beings  in their  being  (in  a
            metaphysically  committed  sense),  the  use  of  his
            analysis to explicate the Yogaacaara  aalaya would be
            combined with a metaphysical  claim--namely, that the
            aalaya in its true or perfected  state as Thusness is
            the source  of being  (real  and unreal) of all other
            entities.  This comparative  effort, while  not fully
            integrating  the Yogaacaara aalayavij~naana  into the
            phenomenological    framework,    nevertheless    can
            supplement  the discussion  of the aalaya and perhaps
            obviate  some  of the  difficulties  inherent  in its
            interpretation.

                                    NOTES

            1.  The discussion  of the Yogaacaara school includes
                Asa^nga and his follower Vasabandhu, supplemented
                by  elements  from  earlier  anonymous   idealist
                Suutras.

            2.  See A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism (Delhi: Motilal
                Banarsidass, 1970).

            3.  Ramakant  A.  Sinari,  The  Structure  of  Indian
                Thought  (Springfield, Illinois: Charles  Thomas,
                1970), p.98.Sylvain L'evi notes in his Mateeriaux
                pour  l'e'tude  du systeeme  Vij~naptimaatra: the
                term "aalaya"  includes  "...  the entire  domain
                which we today designate as the subconscious  and
                the unconscious...."  (Paris: Librairie  Ancienne
                Honore Champion, 1932), p. 10.

            4.  Ninian  Smart, Doctrine  and  Argument  in Indian
                Philosophy  (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964),
                p. 58.

            5.  See   Vasubandhu,  Tri^m`sika,   v.   2,   trans.
                Wing-Tsit  Chan  as "The  Thirty  Verses  on  the
                Mind-Only  Doctrine"  in A Source  Book in Indian
                Philosophy, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and C.  A. Moore
                (Princeton,  New  Jersey:  Princeton   University
                Press, 1957), p.  334;  the same translation also
                appears  in A Source Book in Chinese  Philosophy,
                ed.  W.  Chan  (Princeton, New  Jersey: Princeton
                University

     

                                    p. 14

                Press, 1963), p. 380 (hereafter cited as SBIP and
                SBCP).  Also, see The La^nkaavataara  Suutra, Ch.
                6, v. 82, trans.  D. T. Suzuki (London: Routledge
                & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932), p.  190.  On manas, see
                Asa^nga, Mahaayaanasa^mgraha, Ch. I, v. 59, no. 3
                and  4, trans.  Etienne  Lamothe, as La somme  du
                grand  vehicule   (Louvain:  Bureaux  de  Museon,
                1934), p. 81; Vasubandhu, Tri^m`sika, v. 5, SBIP,
                p.   334   (SBCP,  p.   383) .   On   the   third
                transformation, see Vasubandhu, Tri^m`sika, v. 5,
                SBIP, p. 334 (SBCP, p. 383).

            6. Ch.  1,  v.  3, p.  13.  Confer.  Sa^mdhinirmocana
                Suutra, Ch.  5, v.  7, trans.  Etienne  Lamote as
                L'explication   des   mysteres   (Paris:   Adrien
                Maisonneuve,   1935)  ,   p.   186;   Vasubandhu,
                Tri^m`sika, vv.  2 and 5, SBIP, p.  334 (SBCP, p.
                380).

            7. Ch.  1,  vv.  14-15,  pp.  32-33.  While  in  many
                contexts  the Indian  term dharma means duty, the
                Buddhist idealists often use the term to refer to
                conscious  activities, that  is, both the process
                and the products of those activities.

            8. See La^nkaavataara, Ch.  6, v.  82, p. 193, and v.
                83, p. 195. Also, Asa^nga, Ch.  1, vv. 58-59, pp.
                80-81.  D.  T.  Suzuki, in  his  Studies  in  the
                La^nkaavataara  Suutra (London: Routledge & Kegan
                Paul  Ltd., 1930), characterizes  the "perfuming"
                of the aalaya  as follows: "...  it is a kind  of
                energy  that  is  left  behind  when  an  act  is
                accomplished  and has the power  to rekindle  the
                old and seek out new impressions.... Through this
                `perfuming',...we  have a world of opposites  and
                contraries  with all its practical consequences."
                P. 99. Confer. L'evi, p. 10.

            9. The aalaya  doctrine  is also intended  to address
                the  problem  of retribution  and transmigration.
                The  aalaya   thus   provides   the  ground   for
                adjudicating   moral  consistency   between   the
                different  "lives" of each individual  spirit, as
                well  as for empirical  consistency  between  the
                different  moments of experiencing.  See Asa^nga,
                Ch. 1, v. 59, no. 2, p. 81.

            10.  In  most Buddhist  literature, nirvaa.na  is the
                term which refers to the goal of human existence,
                the  attainment   of  unity  with  the  one  true
                reality.  What is actually attained in this state
                is open to interpretation;  for example, it could
                be  a  complete  cessation  of  activity  or  the
                achievement of the purest activity.

            11. Ch. 1, v. 16, p. 34.

            12. See   Ashok  Kumar   Chatterjee,  The  Yogaacaara
                Idealism  (Varanasi: Bhargava Bhashan, 1962), pp.
                132-133:  "...   the  aalaya  as  a  constructive
                hypothesis  must be accepted  either as one or as
                many;   in  neither   case   is  it  free  [from]
                difficulties.  This indicates only that it is not
                ultimate." Chatterjee  notes that the aalaya must
                be grounded  in the Absolute  because  the aalava
                can  never   reach  a  pure  state:  "It  already
                contains the seed of self-disruption  in the form
                of this implicit  duality...  between  itself and
                its contents," p.  117.  Chatterjee himself leans
                toward a Hegelian  interpretation  of Yogaacaara,
                such that the bare identity of the aalaya and the
                Absolute (true reality) is impossible.

            13. Trans.,  Wing--Tsit  Chan  as  "Treatise  on  the
                Establishment  of the Doctrine  of Consciousness-
                Only" in SBCP, p. 392.

            14. See Smart, p.  58: The aalaya  "...is not part of
                what  constitutes   the  individual,  cannot   be
                considered  as the name for an entity peculiar to
                any individual."  Compare Surendranath  Dasgupta,
                Indian Idealism (Cambridge: Cambridge  University
                Press,  1962) ,  pp.   115-119,  who   interprets
                Vasubandhu  to mean  that  the aalaya  is only  a
                hypothetical  state which grounds  all individual
                experiencing  subjects;  as such, the  aalaya  is
                unitary.

                Chatterjee,    however,   proposes    that    the
                interpretation  of the aalaya  as unitary  can be
                maintained only when unity is interpreted as "the
                harmony  obtaining  between the moments belonging
                to  different  series, as between  moments  of  a
                single  series...,  the  unity  of  the  temporal
                succession," p. 132.

            15. See  Sa^mdhinirmocana,  Ch.   6,  vv.   3-6,  pp.
                188-189; Asa^nga, Ch. 2, v. 1, p. 87; Vasubandhu,
                Tri^m`sika, vv.  20-21, SBIP, p.  336  ( SBCP, p.
                393); Hs乤n-Tsang, SBCP, p.  393.  Compare A.  K.
                Warder, Ch. 11, especially pp, 1130, 438-439.

            16. See Chatterjee, p.  124: "When the aalaya  starts
                functioning,  there  is  no  Absolute, since  the
                aalaya   itself   is   the   Absolute   defiled."
                Consequently, perfected  reality  as the Absolute
                is,  in  a  sense,  the  aalaya   purified.   The
                diffference between this interpretation  and mine
                is  perhaps  simply  a  matter  of  nomenclature.
                Compare Sinari, p. 98, and La^nkaavataara, Ch. 2,
                v. 18, p.  55.  Suzuki in his introduction to the
                La^nkaavataara  states: "The [Tathaagata-] Garbha
                is  from  the  psychological  point  of view  the
                AAlayavij~naana..., "   pp.   xxxix-xl.   Suzuki,
                however,  claims   a  distinction   between   the
                Lan^nkaavataara  and  the  Yogaacaarins  on  this
                point: "But the aalayavij~naana of the Yogaacaara
                is not the


                                    p. 15

                same  as that  of La^nkaavataara....  The  former
                conceives  the aalaya  to be purity  itself  with
                nothing defiled in it, whereas the La^nkaavataara
                ...   make[s]   it  the  cause   of  purity   and
                defilement," ibid. Suzuki fails to note that, for
                the  Yogaacaara,  the  aalaya  in  its  dependent
                nature  is defiled  by its seeds, thus continuing
                to produce further mistaken dharmas.  In contrast
                to   the   foregoing, Dasgupta  sees a   complete
                distinction   between   the   aalaya   and   pure
                consciousness: "As ground of this aalayavij~naana
                we     have     pure     consciousness     called
                vij~naptimaatra, which is beyond all experiences,
                transcendent and pure consciousness...; even this
                aalayavij~naana  is an imposition  on it..."  pp.
                119- 120.

            17. Chatterjee  discusses  this problem  but finds no
                satisfactory solution, p. 131.

            18. V,  4, SBIP,  p.  334  (SBCP,  p.  380).  Compare
                Sa^mdhinirmocana, Ch. 5, v.  4, p. 185, and v. 6,
                p. 186; La^nkaavataara, Ch. 6, v. 81, p. 190.

            19. Husserliana,  vol.  10:  Zur  Phanomenolagie  des
                inneren  Zeitbewusstseins,  ed.  R.   Boehm  (The
                Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966),”34, p. 73;trans.
                J.  Churchill  as The  Phenomenology  of Internal
                Time-Consciousness (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
                University Press, 1964), p. 98.  Compare Husserl,
                Erfahrung und Urteil, 3d ed., rev. and ed.  by L.
                Landgrebe (Hamburg: Claassen, 1964),” 38, p.191,
                trans.  J.  S.   Churchill  and  K.   Ameriks  as
                Experience   and  Judgment  (Evanston,  Illinois:
                Northwestern University Press, 1977), p. 165.

            20. Husserliana,  vol.   3:  Ideen  zu  einer  reinen
                Phanomenologie       und       phanomenologischen
                Philosophie, Book I, ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: M.
                Nijhoff, 1950), p. 199.

            21. Zeitbewusstseins,” 36, p.75  (trans.,  p.  100);
                compare  Husserl  MSC 13 II (1934), p.  9, Edmund
                Husserl Archives, Cologne, West Germany.

            22. See note 18.

            23. Zeitbewusstseins, Beilage 6, p.  113 (trans., pp.
                152-153).

            24. Ibid., pp. 75, 112(trans., pp. 100 and 150-151).

            25. Husserl  MS  C  3 III  (1931), pp.  23-24, Edmund
                Husserl  Archives,  Cologne,  West  Germany.  See
                Klaus  Held, Legendige  Gegenwavt  (The Hague: M.
                Nijhoff, 1966).

            26. Husserliana, vol.  6: Die Krisis  der Europ刬sche
                Wissenschaften     und     die    transzendentale
                Phanomenologie,  ed.  W.  Biemel  (The  Hague: M.
                Nijhoff, 1954), p. 175; trans.  David Carr as The
                Crisis  of European  Sciences  and Transcendental
                Phenomenology  (Evanston,  Illinois: Northwestern
                University Press, 1970), p. 172.

            27. Husserliana,     vol.     9:    Ph刵omenologische
                Psychologie,  ed.   W.   Biemel  (The  Hague:  M.
                Nijhoff, 1962), p. 475.  "All my pasts lie in me,
                in the streaming present...."

            28. Husserliana, vol.  1. Cartesianische Meditationen
                und Pariser Vortr刧e, ed. S. Strasser (The Hague:
                M.  Nijhoff, 1950),” 33, p.102; trans. D. Cairns
                as Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: M.  Nijhoff,
                1964), pp. 66-67.

            29. Husserliana, vol. 17: Formale and transzendentale
                Logik, ed.  P.  Janssen  (The Hague: M.  Nijhoff,
                1974;1st ed., Halle: M. Niemeyer,1929),” 85, pp.
                215-216;   trans.   D.   Cairns   as  Formal  and
                Transcendental  Logic  (The  Hague:  M.  Nijhoff,
                1969), p. 207.

            30. Ibid.

            31. Ibid., p. 226 (trans., p. 218).

            32. Kenneth  K.  Inada discusses  the feasibility  of
                applying the notion of temporality  (not of time)
                to the Buddhist  doctrine  in his  article, "Time
                and Temporality--A Buddhist Approach," Philosophy
                East and West  24, no.  2 (April, 1974): 171-179.
                While not specifically directed toward Yogaacaara
                Buddhism, the  discussion  offers  an account  of
                temporality different from Husserl's.

            33. Husserl  MS  C 7 I (1932), p.  4, Edmund  Husserl
                Archives,  Cologne,  West   Germany.   See  Held,
                Foreword,  pp.  x  and  30:  "`Now'  as  the  one
                remaining   form  of  presence  and  `Now'  as  a
                changing time-point  among others..."  are Held's
                characterization  of the present as both standing
                and streaming. See Husserl, Erfbhrung, Beilage I,
                pp.  467-468 (trans., p. 386); Husserl MS C 3 III
                (1931), pp.  29-31, and  MS  B 1II  9 (1931), pp.
                36-37,  Edmund  Husserl  Archives, Cologne,  West
                Germany.

     

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